GIRLS DON’T JUST WANNA HAVE FUN: MOVING PAST TITLE IX’S CONTACT SPORTS EXCEPTION by Caggiano, Jessica Constance
* I would like to thank Deborah L. Brake, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of
Law for all of the feedback she provided throughout this process. It was very much appreciated. In addition,
I would like to thank Angela Kost, who took time out of her own busy academic schedule to acquaint me
with her athletic experience. I would also like to thank Sonia S. Shariff, Esquire, for her helpful comments,
the University of Pittsburgh Law Review staff, and especially my family for supporting me.
1. Letter from Angela Kost to author (Jan. 4, 2009) (on file with the University of Pittsburgh Law
Review). For more on Angela’s successful ice hockey career, see http://www.collegehockeystats.net/0809/
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TITLE IX’S CONTACT SPORTS EXCEPTION
Jessica Constance Caggiano*
I had to fight many battles being the only girl. These battles were not only physical
but mental. When people told me that a girl should not play a man’s sport, I took
offense to it. I had just as much skill as they did and there was no reason why I
should not have been out there. My work ethic and dedication was not more or less
than the guys’.
It got hard when I started playing JV and Varsity hockey; the guys were getting
bigger and stronger. It was sometimes hard to play against them because I knew I
could possibly get hurt. But I just made sure I kept my head up and I was not going
to let a guy stop me from playing the sport I love. All of this would make me work
harder as well.
Both the physical and mental struggles I had to go through made me a stronger
person because the mental side of it, when someone told me I shouldn’t be playing
a man’s sport, it made me want to go out there and play harder and beat who ever
said it. The physical part of it made me a stronger player. Playing now on a girl’s
[sic] team I am a very aggressive player. I tell myself that no one will beat me. If I
can take a hit from a guy who is taller and weighs more then [sic] me, I will be able
to take a hit from a girl my size.
If I could I would definitely do it again . . . .
Angela Kost, on playing junior varsity and varsity ice hockey for Moon Area High
School’s Boys’ Team.1
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rosters/rmuw.
2. See CBC News, Winnipeg girls win right to play on boys’ hockey team, http://www.cbc.ca/
canada/manitoba/story/2006/09/22/hockey-decision.html (last visited May 22, 2010); Matt Porter, Girls’
Hockey Picking Up Steam: 92 High Schools Now Field Squads Across The State (Jan. 1, 2009),
http://www.boston.com/sports/schools/hockey/articles/2009/01/01/girls_hockey_picking_up_steam_12
30667971/?page=1 (discussing how Denese Kerrissey became the first female to play in the boys’ ice
hockey state tournament in Massachusetts in the spring of 1992); Posting of Gretchen to Girls Can’t Play
Football, http://girlscantwhat.com/girls-cant-play-football/ (Mar. 20, 2007) (including many posted
comments from high school girls playing football and other traditionally male-dominated sports on boys’
teams). Ironically, the creator of the website requested that girls post their stories about playing on boys’
teams, acknowledging how hard it is to search for this kind of information on the web by noting that
“finding information about ‘Girls Football [sic]’ on the Internet has proved to be quite the challenge.” Id.
3. See, e.g., A History of Girls Playing Tackle Football, http://www.fortunecity.com/wembley/
mueller/641/princesses/timeline.html (last visited May 22, 2010) (discussing the history of women playing
on men’s college football teams).
4. See, e.g., Mark Spezia, Goodrich’s C.C. Weber Completes Wrestling Quadruple Crown, THE
FLINT J., Aug. 3, 2008, available at http://blog.mlive.com/flintjournal/prepsnow/2008/08/goodrichs_
cc_weber_completes_wrestling_quadruple_c.html (discussing C.C. Weber, a two-time state qualifier in
high school boys’ wrestling and the first girl to win a match in the state tournament); Tim Twentyman,
Goodrich’s Weber Continues A Year of Firsts, THE DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 9, 2007, available at
http://www.wrestlegirl.com/gnews1823.htm (also discussing C.C. Weber’s achievements).
5. See, e.g., ESPN.com, Report: Kicker Dismissed by Georgia Team for Being a Girl, (Aug. 31,
2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/highschool/news/story?id=3560929.
6. CHARLIE LOVETT, The Fight to Establish the Women’s Race, in OLYMPIC MARATHON, available
at http://www.marathonguide.com/history/olympicmarathons/chapter25.cfm.
7. See Marathon Records, http://www.marathonguide.com/history/records/ (last visited May 22,
2010).
Angela Kost’s situation, while admirable, is not unique; many girls have
played or currently play contact sports on boys’ high school teams  or on2
men’s college teams.  Others have possessed, and currently possess, not only3
the skills necessary to compete with men, but also the ability to achieve high
levels of athletic success.  Still, the current state of the law has deprived some4
female athletes of the opportunity to test their limits.  It is for these athletes5
that we need to examine and, ultimately, change the laws currently affecting
women’s athletic opportunities.
It was not so long ago that much of society considered women physically
incapable of running marathons without injury,  let alone competent to6
compete with men in any sport—contact or non-contact. Today, such medical
“certainties” have melted away as the gap between the women’s and the men’s
marathon world record has narrowed to little more than ten minutes and
barriers confronting female runners have disappeared.  At the same time,7
many people currently believe that, although some exceptional women are
able, the majority of female athletes cannot physically compete on the same
2010] GIRLS DON’T JUST WANNA HAVE FUN 121
8. See Dana Robinson, Comment, A League of Their Own: Do Women Want Sex-Segregated
Sports?, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 321, 346 (1998); see also, e.g., posting of Cody C. to
SerendipUpdate’s Blog, http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1753?page=1 (Feb. 3, 2009, 22:01)
(last visited May 22, 2010) (“I am not saying that some girls aren’t as athletic as guys, but MOST aren’t.”)
(representing a portion of the public’s opinion on the subject).
9. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006) (authorizing the promulgation of regulations).
10. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2006).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006) (authorizing the promulgation of regulations).
14. See, e.g., Williams v. School Dist., 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993) (challenging, on behalf of their
level as men in sports specifically contact sports.  This way of thinking is well8
represented within the regulations of Title IX of the 1972 Education
Amendments—the governing law for many public and private schools that
receive federal funding.  These regulations allow for sex-segregated athletic9
teams  and include a contact sports exception (CSE) which provides that10
covered schools do not have to allow women to try out for men’s contact
sports teams.11
This note will discuss the aforementioned social perspective, along with
other barriers to elimination, and justifications for maintaining the CSE. At
their best, these impediments slow the progression of the law and the
liberalization of society for female athletes. At their worst, they prevent the
alteration or elimination of the CSE  to Title IX.  This evaluation will12 13
primarily analyze the possible justifications for promulgation of the CSE and
ultimately recommend that Congress eliminate it. Finally, this note examines
the consequences of removing the CSE and reviews other alternatives to the
current law that would further liberalize our sex-segregated system of
athletics.
Part I of this note will provide a general overview of Title IX, focusing
on the CSE specifically, and will examine what its legislative history reveals
about its purpose. In addition, Part I will also discuss the applicability of and
the current rights of female athletes under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause (EPC).
Part II will expand upon the possible purposes for the CSE addressed in
Part I by identifying and analyzing other possible justifications. This section
will ultimately recommend immediate elimination of the CSE and describe the
state of the law post-elimination. However, removing the CSE will not
eliminate the political and social issues surrounding it, or the ever-present
concerns of many citizens about lawsuits involving Title IX and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s EPC.  In fact, since many members of the public14
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son, exclusion from girls’ field hockey team under Title IX and the EPC; heavily criticized); Kleczek ex rel.
Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991) (challenging denial of a spot
on girls’ field hockey team for a male student). Various blog posts also demonstrate the charged atmosphere
surrounding Title IX. For instance, one individual stated, “Let’s forget about gendered teams; there should
be one-sport teams, and boys and girls should be allowed to play on them equally. Coed. None of this
segregation.” Posting of Anonymous to SerendipUpdate’s Blog, http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/
node/1753 (May 2, 2009, 21:02) (last visited May 22, 2010). Another person emphatically stated, “IF A
GIRL WANTS TO PLAY WITH A BOY IN A SPORT THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED BECAUSE
THEY GOT [sic] ALL THE RIGHTS THAT A MALE HAS. BUT I ALSO BELIEVE THAT A MALE
COULD PARTICIPATED [sic] IN A FEMALE SPORTS THAT WAY EVERY THING [sic] COULD
STAY EVEN.” Posting of Jose Angeles to SerendipUpdate’s Blog, http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/
node/1753 (Apr. 23, 2009, 13:11) (last visited May 22, 2010).
15. See, e.g., Jonathan Little, Running Against the Wind: Sex Discrimination in High School Girl’s
Cross Country, 76 UMKC L. REV. 711, 716 (2008) (“While the argument of increased risk of injury to
females may have merit in contact sports, such as football or rugby, this is not the case in non-contact
sports, such as distance running . . . .”) (emphasis added); Nishan Wilde, Women in Men’s Sports-Should
it be Allowed?, EZINE ARTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?Women-in-Mens-Sports—Should-it-be-
Allowed?&id=621061 (last visited May 22, 2010) (“[W]hen it comes to contact sports, there are just too
many issues and obstacles in the way. Not only are men at a psychological disadvantage because of our
society’s consensus towards gentle treatment of women, but also, women can often times find themselves
in very compromising, even dangerous situations. Therefore, women in men’s sports is not a good idea.”).
Similarly, another individual noted, “[O]kay [I] want to play football but . . . my dad says it’s a MAN sport
and that girls should either be in the bleachers ir [sic] cheerleading EWWW i cannot belive [sic] i just said
that word!” Posting of Jenny to SerendipUpdate’s Blog, http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1753
(July 15, 2009, 22:12) (last visited May 22, 2010) (representing a portion of the public’s opinions on the
subject).
16. See, e.g., Catherine Jean Archibald, De-Clothing Sex-Based Classifications—Same-Sex
Marriage is Just the Beginning: Achieving Formal Sex Equality in the Modern Era, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 1,
35 (2009) (arguing for sex integration, but that when “physical difference[s]” begin to separate males and
females, “there are sex-neutral ways of dividing teams that will be fair to both men and women. . . .
Similarly, all sports teams can be divided based on skill, weight, strength, or other sex-neutral
characteristic[s]. . . . [W]here a school used to have a boys’ team and a girls’ team, it could now have teams
for people under a certain height or weight, and over a certain height or weight” (footnote omitted)); Aaron
J. Hershtal, Does Title IX Work After School? California Applies the Three Part Test to Municipal Sports,
12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 653, 684 (2006) (referencing, briefly, that one court noted that “standards
focusing on height, weight, or skill rather than solely on gender represents one such approach,” but declined
to go into detail).
accept the assumptions inherent in many CSE justifications,  its elimination15
would likely spur public debate.
As such, Part III of this note will examine alternatives to Title IX’s
system of athletics that go beyond mere CSE elimination. This article will
focus on analyzing the viability of a proposal that other authors have not
substantially discussed;  a system of athletics that allows schools to use16
objective criteria, such as weight/height standards, in determining the
eligibility of athletes to try out for the opposite sex’s contact sports teams.
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17. See Blake J. Furman, Note, Gender Equality in High School Sports: Why There Is a Contact
Sports Exemption to Title IX, Eliminating It, and a Proposal for the Future, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1169, 1187 (2007) (“Although abolishing the CSE is an appropriate starting point, its
elimination is not a colossal leap forward. The concept that women should be able to try out for men’s
teams and be judged by their skill level is so basic to our understanding of discrimination that it is
surprising that the CSE still exists.” (footnote omitted)); Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Sports
Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in a Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REV. 381, 384–85 (2000)
(speculating that the rising success and popularity of female sports would put pressure on public officials
to change the law).
18. For example, qualified females displacing males on “male” contact sports teams.
19. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006).
20. See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 92-554, at 5, 51–52, 108–09 (1971) (discussing both concerns
about women’s opportunities with regard to enrollment in colleges and the need to protect teachers and staff
of educational institutions from sex discrimination, as they were not covered by Title VII; however, notably
absent is any specific language expressing concern for women’s opportunities in sports in contrast to public
perception about exactly what the law does).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
Despite the potential of some of these alternatives and the seeming
propriety behind eliminating the CSE, Part IV will discuss the practicality of
expecting any real change in the current regulations. Many authors at the time
of writing their articles considered CSE elimination to be the eventual result,17
and yet the CSE remains intact, approximately 35 years after its
implementation.
This note will conclude by briefly discussing ways to change the status
quo, such as what society can do to begin to move past the CSE. Although
some groups would inevitably suffer negative effects if the CSE were
eliminated,  to allow it to continue results in greater harm to both individuals18
and society as a whole.
PART I. THE INFAMOUS TITLE IX
A. Title IX’s Promulgation
Congress passed Title IX as a part of the 1972 Education Amendments19
and although today it is best known publicly as a law affecting opportunities
for women’s sports, Congress’ original intent and the language of the law
itself was, and is, much broader:  “No person in the United States shall, on20
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”21
The Department of Education promulgated regulations for Title IX in
1975, including a section specifically explaining how it wanted the
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22. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2000).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2000).
26. Id.
27. The debate on whether separate can be equal did not end with Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (discussing whether Virginia’s
offer to create a similar women’s military college would remedy its equal protection violation); see also
infra note 83 (describing the current debate on sex-separated schooling).
28. This note does not pretend to address a school’s liability under Title IX in such a situation. A
school may have an obligation under the law to provide female athletes with a girls’ sports team if the
requisite level of interest is present. However, that is not the focus of this note, which merely uses it as an
example of a situation in which there might only be a boys’ team or a girls’ team, but at least one interested
female or male athlete to discuss the school’s obligations with regard to letting her or him try out for the
opposite sex’s team.
29. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2000).
aforementioned language interpreted and applied with regard to athletics.22
The law’s language generally prohibits covered entities from discriminating
on the basis of sex and from excluding persons from participating in “any
interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics on the basis of
sex.”23
Despite the broadness of the general rule, an exception is described for
team segregation based on sex.  However, separate must mean equal24
opportunity, at the least.  The Department of Education’s regulations list25
several factors to be considered by a court evaluating whether a covered entity
has complied. These factors include the quality and provision of sporting
equipment among separate teams, travel allowances and opportunities, the
accommodation of individual abilities and interests, and the availability of a
practice field or other areas, to name a few.26
On its face, this “separate but equal” solution seems practicable;27
however, many of the affected, covered entities are public schools and
universities that could encounter financial difficulties complying. This lack of
resources could result in the inability of a school to provide both a men’s and
a women’s team for a particular sport where a school may have, traditionally,
only provided a sports team for one particular sex.  However, if a school has28
a sports team for one sex and not for the other, and opportunities for that sex
have “previously been limited,” the individual deprived of a team has a right
to try out for a position on the opposite sex’s existing team.29
Although perhaps fair on its face, the regulation does not stop there. The
right to try out for the opposite sex’s team evaporates under Title IX if the
sport happens to be one the regulations designate as a “contact sport”:
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30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 647–48 (4th Cir. 1999) (Discussing the post-hoc
consequences of a university’s decision to exercise its right to voluntarily allow members of the opposite
sex on to a contact sport team under Title IX. In this case, Duke University initially allowed Heather Mercer
to join the men’s college football team.).
32. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2000) (“[M]embers of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out
for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport.”) (emphasis added). There is a right to a
try-out that disappears if the sport is a contact sport, but there is no language prohibiting a covered entity
from permitting her to try-out; hence the existence of girls currently playing on boys’ contact sports teams.
See generally Mercer, 190 F.3d at 647–48.
33. See, e.g., Adams ex rel. Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1505 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding
plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of her equal protection claim; school could not preclude female
student from joining boy’s wrestling team); Lantz ex rel. Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (enjoining school district from preventing female athlete from trying out for boys’ football team as
a matter of equal protection); Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis.
1978) (holding plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated by athletic association’s rule preventing them
from trying out for boy’s sports teams).
[A] recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where
selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is
a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a
particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for
members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have
previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for
the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this
part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball
and other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.30
The ability of a girl to play a contact sport on a boys’ team is solely within the
discretion of the covered entity—at the high school level, usually a school
district—as is the initial right to try out for the team at all.  The school31
district may deny her an opportunity to try out regardless of her individual
capacity or talent, and solely because of her sex.32
B. Equal Protection Clause Options
A girl’s right to try out for a boys’ contact sports team under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s EPC is both broader and narrower than what Title
IX’s CSE encompasses. It is broader in that most courts have consistently held
that public institutions may not preclude female athletes from trying out for
boy’s contact sports teams.  However, it is narrower in that affected female33
athletes may only bring suit under the EPC against a public institution. In
contrast, private institutions, many of which are Title IX entities because they
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34. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
35. The Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia would seem to compel this result, as Justice Ginsburg
wrote that even if there were a “parallel” women’s military institute, its existence would not necessarily,
and did not in this case, remedy the constitutional violation. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547–57;
Jamal Greene, Hands Off Policy: Equal Protection and the Contact Sports Exemption of Title IX, 11 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 133, 144 (2005) (noting that Virginia elevated the standard for meeting an “excessively
persuasive justification” under the intermediate scrutiny test). But see, e.g., Leffel, 444 F. Supp. at 1121
(holding that when a girls’ team was already provided, female athletes did not have a constitutional right
to try out for a boys’ contact sports team just because the competition was allegedly better; noting that the
association’s failure to provide a sufficiently comparable female team might give a female the right to try
out for the boys’ team where a girls’ team already exists).
36. See, e.g., Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
excluding boys from playing on girls’ volleyball teams was not a violation of the equal protection clause
because the policy’s purpose was to promote opportunities for girls and to remedy past discrimination);
Kleczek ex rel. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D.R.I. 1991) (denying
injunctive relief, in part, because plaintiff was unlikely to be successful on the merits of his Equal
Protection claim where excluding male student from girl’s field hockey team was unlikely to be a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause).
37. See also Archibald, supra note 16, at 5–9 (2009) (noting critically that intermediate scrutiny,
instead of strict scrutiny is applied to sex-based classifications in Equal Protection cases).
38. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Leans Conservative, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/25/AR2007062501047.html.
39. See generally Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind
Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 144 (2001) (“Moreover, the contact sports exemption remains a
powerful contributor to the ideology of male dominance and superiority in sports.”).
accept some form of federal funding, are free to prevent girls from even trying
out for boys’ contact sports teams.34
More specifically, since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Virginia, girls arguably have a right to try out for the boys’ team even when
a girls’ team already exists.  The majority of courts have declined to similarly35
allow men to try out for women’s sports teams, even when the school has no
such team for males.36
Although courts have held that girls have a constitutional right to try out
for boys’ teams, the CSE remains a stopper on the rights of female athletes for
several reasons. Title IX’s regulations technically apply to any institution that
accepts federal dollars because the Supreme Court has never found the CSE
to be unconstitutional. Thus, the CSE still governs the conduct of public
institutions; the burden is then on the female athlete to enforce her rights
under the EPC by filing suit.  Also a concern, the Supreme Court’s political37
balance has shifted since Virginia was decided.  Regardless, the EPC does38
not help female athletes at private institutions covered by Title IX at all. CSE
applies to private, Title IX entities in full force and thus, remains a formidable
opponent to female athletes.39
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40. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688.
41. See Sangree, supra note 17, at 387 (“Contact sports are nowhere mentioned in Title IX or in its
legislative history. Indeed, the statute’s application to athletics was barely mentioned before it was enacted
in 1972.”).
42. Furman, supra note 17, at 1172 (citing Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380,
88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974) (codified as 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)).
43. Sangree, supra note 17, at 387.
44. Sangree, supra note 17, at 387–88 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1998)).
45. See B. Glenn George, Fifty/Fifty: Ending Sex Segregation in School Sports, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
1107, 1129 (2002) (arguing that the NCAA’s influence is why basketball, the nature of which is arguably
not physical contact, was included with other contact sports in the CSE’s language).
46. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974) (codified as 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)); Furman, supra note 17, at 1172; see also 34 C.F.R. § 106.41; Cohen v. Brown
Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 165 n.5 (1st Cir. 1996) (“The regulations and agency documents discussed herein
were originally promulgated by HEW, the administering agency at the time, and later adopted by the present
C. The CSE’s Roots
One might initially assume that the inclusion of the CSE in the
regulations was a statutory mandate, or at least heavily debated among
legislators. However, just as Title IX’s specific effect on women’s athletic
opportunities was not heavily discussed or even anticipated,  the CSE was not40
either.  The closest evidence of Congressional intent for the CSE is the so-41
called Javits Amendment. This Amendment resulted when heavy lobbying
efforts by the NCAA and attempts by Senator John Tower, R-Tex, at passing
an amendment to protect revenue sports failed. The Javits Amendment
“directed the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to
implement regulations for intercollegiate athletics with ‘reasonable provisions
considering the nature of particular sports.’”  HEW proposed the initial42
regulations, which did not include the CSE.  After the comment period for43
HEW’s first set of proposed regulations had passed, the CSE was proposed
and became part of the law in 1975.44
Because of its ambiguity, one reasonable interpretation of the legislative
and administrative history of the CSE is that HEW included it in the
regulations to protect men’s revenue sports from Title IX’s effects. The
NCAA’s concerns and its lobbying efforts to protect big “money-makers” like
college football and basketball may have led to the ambiguous language that
accompanied the 1974 directive to HEW to promulgate regulations for Title
IX generally.  That directive gave HEW the authority to promulgate45
regulations for “reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular
sports.”46
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administering agency, DED.”).
47. Furman, supra note 17, at 1175–76.
48. See id. at 1187.
49. See, e.g., supra note 15. This next individual commented on an article discussing co-ed
possibilities and stated that “girls shouldn’t be able to play with us men. [T]hey’ll get their heads taken off
easily. I am 14 and I play hockey and lacrosse and if girls played, THEY WOULD DIE!!! GO MEN!!”
Posting of Anonymous to SerendipUpdate’s Blog, http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/
1753?page=2 (May 2, 2008, 14:09) (last visited May 22, 2010). Granted this is an exaggerated example,
mostly added for humor, but it does tend to show how children are socialized with regard to this issue at
a young age. This could also explain why, even as adults, many people still have lingering doubts about
women and men playing together.
Subsequently, HEW issued a policy interpretation in 1979 in which it
clarified that a school may have an obligation to create an equivalent female
team if females had been historically disadvantaged in a particular activity or
sport, there was sufficient female interest to sustain a team, and interested
females had the ability to play the game.  To some, this may appear to47
mitigate the harshness of the CSE, but it also reaffirmed the CSE’s
applicability. Where a female athlete is unable to rally such support, she may
be left unable to participate in the sport at all.
Although the NCAA’s interest in lobbying for a revenue sports exclusion
is self-evident, it is far from certain that its interference resulted in the CSE’s
promulgation. An examination and understanding of other justifications for
the CSE is helpful in analyzing whether or not there is a legitimate basis for
it. This note will consider justifications for the CSE that have been suggested
by courts, school districts, scholars, and other parties.
PART II. THE REASONS THEY STAND BEHIND AND THE REASONS THAT
HIDE BEHIND THEM—DOES THE CSE MAKE SENSE?
A. Is Protectionism Behind the CSE?
Many scholars find it easy to conclude that the CSE is unnecessarily
discriminatory and unjustified,  and yet much of society finds the line drawn48
by the CSE to be not just fathomable, but the only natural result.  Why does49
it sound natural, normal, and even logical to separate girls and boys from
playing physical sports together? The danger of the CSE, and perhaps its long-
life span, can be attributed in part to its apparent logic on the surface. It is only
by delving deeper through a healthy critique of all possible justifications that
society can begin to examine what legitimacy, if any, this social norm truly
contains and whether it is worth maintaining the status quo.
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50. In fact, the author of this note knows and faithfully argues with a few people who hold these
views.
51. See, e.g., supra notes 15, 49. Similarly, this next person noted, “I would be wondering why she
[a girl who wants to play football] doesn’t want to do what the other girls are doing, perhaps cheerleading.
Why is she so motivated to stand out in a tom-boyish fashion? If there were such a thing as an all girls [sic]
team, maybe it would be acceptable. But even then, a girl is being groomed, by the nature of the game, for
a ‘road construction’ mind set rather than the softer, more feminine roles appreciated by society.” Posting
of mrazzip to InfoSports: Girls in Football, http://www.infosports.com/football/arch/2378.htm (last visited
May 22, 2010).
52. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 350 (addressing briefly an argument forwarded by many that
women will be more easily injured and conceding this position regarding football and rugby).
53. Virginia P. Croudace & Steven A. Desmarais, Where the Boys Are: Can Separate Be Equal in
School Sports?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1425, 1446–47 (1985) (citing Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic
Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d 284, 293 n.34 (Supreme Judicial Ct. of Mass., Suffolk 1979) (discussing
different athletic attributes of each sex)).
54. Robinson, supra note 8, at 346 (arguing against allowing these types of assumptions to guide
the discussion on the eligibility of specific women to compete).
Some members of the public might exclaim that the idea of a girl boxing
with boys is ridiculous and could make some less-than-complimentary
comments about “man-hating feminists” and “drugged-out liberal hippies.”50
While it is unfair to attribute such a reaction to much of society, it is not
uncommon for people to somehow feel that the idea of a boy boxing a girl is
unnatural.51
This gut feeling of abnormality stems, for some, from long-held
stereotypes about the inherent weakness of the female body and corresponding
urges to protect the weak from harm in the form of protectionism.  This note52
does not necessarily concede that, as a group, men are necessarily
physiologically superior, noting and considering the following:
It seems safe to say that, in most forms of direct athletic competition, males will
generally defeat females. This verifiable conclusion might seem to indicate that
physiological differences alone are responsible for the disparity in athletic
performance. This conclusion is not as easily substantiated, however, as other factors
may be involved. For example, male dominance in endurance sports such as long-
distance running, soccer, and swimming may be due primarily to the newness of such
sports (and sports in general) to women; indeed, studies demonstrate that women
have the capacity for greater endurance and stamina than men. The competitive
advantage of males over females in these sports, then, maybe solely attributable to
the longer history of male participation rather than to any physical advantage.53
Nevertheless, protectionist thought processes lead to various assumptions
including, independent of scientific studies on the subject, that men are just
too fast and strong for women to rival.  Logically then, the mind might move54
to concluding that women should not play with men for various reasons:
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55. See Furman, supra note 17, at 1181–82.
56. See, e.g., Little, supra note 15, at 717 (“By not allowing females to run the full 5,000 meter
distance, state athletic associations, particularly the KHSAA, believe they are protecting female distance
runners from the increased likelihood of injury and illness that would result if young women were allowed
to run that distance.”).
57. See Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 53, at 1441–42; see also Furman, supra note 17, at
1181–82 (critically analyzing this belief).
58. See George, supra note 45, at 1129; Robinson, supra note 8, at 346; Sangree, supra note 17,
at 417–18; 421–30 (indicating that safety emerged as a justifying factor for the CSE and also discussing
various cases where protecting females from injury was used as a defense).
59. In Phillips v. Anderson County Bd. of Educ., No. 3:06-CV-35, 2006 WL 3759893, *9 (E.D.
Tenn. Dec. 19, 2006), the female plaintiff was admittedly taken out of an otherwise all male lifting and
conditioning class because her teacher believed removal would protect her from the risk of rape and sexual
assault.
because they slow down the pace of the game for men or spoil the quality of
the competition; because women are not serious enough about sports; because
women are not aggressive or competitive enough; or because women are too
likely to get hurt playing with physically superior athletes. Why should men
have to worry about injuring women when they are trying to enjoy the game,
right? One might then conclude that the cost of allowing women to play with
men outweighs the benefit.
While it is uncertain what exactly the drafters of the CSE had in mind,
these types of protectionist generalizations about women as a group have
something in common with the CSE. Both the CSE and the minds of some
members of society have simplified this complex issue by generalizing about
women as a group. The inherent flaw in both is a propensity to lump men and
women into two separate spheres of athletic ability and judge all members of
each sphere the same.
B. Is the Possibility of an Increased Risk of Injury for Female Athletes a
Legitimate Justification or Just Protectionism in Disguise?
From protectionism,  one could argue, comes the belief that girls are55
more likely to get injured playing sports of any kind,  with that risk becoming56
even greater when girls play contact sports with boys.  Ironically, despite the57
fact that many scholars believe that the notion is archaic and out-of-date,
safety concerns are sometimes the openly-admitted reason for persons
supporting application of the CSE.  Although scholars have reason to doubt58
the persistence of such seemingly archaic beliefs, there is reason to fear that
may not be the case.  “While the argument of increased risk of injury to59
females may have merit in contact sports, such as football or rugby, this is not
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60. Little, supra note 15, at 716.
61. See Furman, supra note 17, at 1182.
62. See, e.g., Lantz ex rel. Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Here the
governmental objective is to protect the health and safety of female students, and there is no quarrel with
the importance of that objective. To demonstrate that the regulation is substantially related to that objective,
the Commissioner and the Board of Regents have offered data establishing that ‘as a general rule, senior
high school students (age 15 through 18) are more physically developed, stronger, more agile, faster and
have greater muscular endurance than their female counterparts’ (Att’y Genl’s brief at 6–18), medical
opposition to girls’ participation on boys’ teams in such contact sports as football (which Dr. Falls
described as a ‘collision’ sport) because of the risk of injury in such participation, and the testimony of
Dr. Willie to the effect, among other points, that the present regulation enhances safety by permitting simple
and uniform administration across the state.”).
63. See, e.g., Adams ex rel. Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996) (noting, in
the context of an Equal Protection challenge to a student’s preclusion from playing on a boys’ team, that
safety is an important governmental objective; nevertheless, granting plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief
because school district’s interest in student safety was not sufficiently related to its policy of excluding all
females from trying out for men’s contact sports teams). Adams exemplifies cases brought under Title IX
and the Equal Protection Clause in which a court disallowed a member of one sex to play on the opposite
sex’s team based on safety concerns, not from a sense of protectionism, but from an ostensible realistic
assessment about the average height and weight differences between the sexes.
the case in non-contact sports, such as distance running, where there are no
major differences in the risk of injury between male and female runners.”60
Protectionism not only encompasses the “injury” justification, but swallows
up the arguments of those who would keep women from playing contact sports
because of the supposed specific risk it places on their reproductive organs.61
However, labeling those concerned with the risk of injury as protectionist
may not be entirely fair. The belief that girls are at a higher risk of injury
when playing with boys does not have to be grounded in protectionist
fantasies and notions about the inherent weakness of a woman’s body. School
districts could and have made strong arguments that the relative average sizes
of the sexes, when looking at height and weight averages or similar objective
factors,  for example, justifies a fear for the safety of women and complete62
segregation between men’s and women’s contact sports.63
Although the logic behind the injury justification seems facially
appealing, there are many problems with it. While it may be the most
convincing of the various possible justifications for the CSE, the injury
justification is not a sufficient reason for keeping the CSE. At best, the injury
justification is a mere consideration in the later discussion of alternatives to
the current sex-segregated system of athletics.
The main problem with separating men and women because of safety
concerns is that school districts compare women as a group to men as a group
in determining who is at greater risk for injury. This is analogous to the way
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64. See supra note 61. That is, assuming height and weight are factors that have been shown to
affect safety in sports. Courts and scholars have acknowledged the supposed link between size and safety.
See also, e.g., Petrie v. Ill. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 862 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979); Adam S.
Daroski, Comment, For Kenny, Who Wanted to Play Women’s Field Hockey, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 153, 158 (2005) (linking size to safety).
65. See generally Deborah Brake, Title IX as Pragmatic Feminism, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 513
(2007) (discussing how the representation of different types of feminist ideology present in Title IX,
combining as a more pragmatic feminism, is one of its strengths).
66. See Equity in Athletics Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 291 Fed. Appx. 517, 523 (4th Cir. 2008)
(citing a litany of case law describing the goals of Title IX as equalizing opportunities between men and
women as groups, stating required program expansion for the underrepresented sex is one goal of the
statute).
67. See generally id.
in which many people’s protectionist preconceptions generalize. Even if it
were true that women as a group are more likely to get injured based on an
assessment of the average high school girl’s height and weight being less than
the average boy’s,  sex-segregation, because of safety concerns, still64
completely ignores the needs of the individual, as it excludes all persons in the
group based on a group statistic at the individual’s expense. Even if this note
concludes that the CSE should give way to individual opportunities to try out
for opposite-sex sports teams, should internal statutory limitations on female
athletic opportunities within Title IX reasonably be interpreted on an
individual, as opposed to a group, basis?
C. Increased Risk of Injury as an Exclusion for Some Individual Girls (and
Some Boys), Not Girls as a Group under Title IX
Title IX incorporates several different aspects of feminist theory,  but65
arguably much of the statute is based on a “differences” feminist theory. In
that sense, Title X’s purpose can be understood as protecting the opportunities
of women as a group, not as individuals.  Thus, applying the CSE—itself an66
internal limitation on Title IX’s expansion of opportunities for women—to all
women as a group does not seem odd at first blush. Despite this, a stronger
argument supports viewing women as individuals, not as a group, when
sections of Title IX—such as the CSE or a reasonable modification of
it—operate to limit their athletic opportunities.
The reason Title IX can be viewed as incorporating a “differences”
feminist theory is because its congressional purpose is to benefit women as a
group and to increase participation in athletics by women as a group.  Since67
increasing the participation and opportunities of women in sports is one goal
of the statute, the courts and the Department of Education should not interpret
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68. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm’n, 454 U.S. 27, 32
(1981) (“[Courts] must reject administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by adjudication
or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrateunder represented
Congress sought to implement.”).
69. See, e.g., Adams ex rel. Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996) (granting
injunctive relief under EPC to female athlete because school’s safety policy preventing women from
competing on men’s wrestling team was, “not substantially related to that objective. The defendants’ only
evidence that plaintiff’s safety is at greater risk because of her gender is based on generalized assumptions
about the differences between males and females regarding physical strength. The evidence shows that some
females are stronger than some males. The school can take into account differences of size, strength, and
experience without assuming those qualities based on gender.” (internal citations omitted)).
70. See Archibald, supra note 16, at 35–36 (in agreement).
limitations on athletic opportunities in a way that frustrates that purpose.68
Thus, the CSE’s exclusion of women as a group from a wider array of athletic
opportunity can also reasonably be understood as frustrating one of the main
purposes of Title IX itself.
Even if one lends credence to the increased-risk-of-injury-for-women
justification, the CSE is overbroad in that it precludes more women than is
necessary from participating in men’s sports to accomplish a goal of
protecting women from supposed greater risk of injury.  This is because there69
are, of course, women of varying height and weight combinations, some of
whom would be at no greater risk than men in competition. Certain women
would not be at any increased risk, or would possess less of a risk than the
group average. Thus, the justification would not apply to these women with
equal force and the risk of injury could not logically be used to keep them
from trying out. Even if increased risk of injury were a legitimate reason for
the CSE, these women are truly precluded because of their sex alone.
D. Even If Individually Analyzed, Increased Risk of Injury as an Alternative
Bar Still Poses Problems
The increased-risk-of-injury justification as a limitation on female
athletes is only truly legitimate if school districts apply their safety
justification to male and female athletes equally. To the extent that school
districts do not equally enforce some sort of safety standard, it is a
discriminatory and protectionist practice to impose that will on smaller,
possibly weaker-than-average females and not on smaller and possibly
weaker-than-average males.  Why should a school district be concerned about70
its average-sized female students getting injured while trying out for the
football team with larger-than-average males when they are not concerned for
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71. See, e.g., Adams, 919 F. Supp. 1496 (noting, in the context of an equal protection challenge to
a student’s preclusion from playing on a boys’ team, that safety is an important governmental objective).
72. See LiveScience Staff, The Most Dangerous Female Sport: Cheerleading, LIVE SCIENCE,
June 26, 2009, available at http://www.livescience.com/health/090626-cheerleading-injuries.html.
similarly-situated male students? The male is often allowed to try out for
America’s high school football teams whereas the female is precluded on
protectionist bases; even more, school districts often attempt to justify their
conduct by pointing to the safety justification.71
In fact, it seems unlikely that safety for women could be the true reason
behind CSE support, as a recent study shows that cheerleading, which many
schools support as a “girls” sport, is the most high-risk sport for girls.72
However, cheerleading for girls flourishes as a sport among school districts,
further supporting the point that it is not really a concern for safety that
schools have in mind.
Although at first glance this reasoning seemed promising, the injury or
safety justification reveals that it is not a legitimate justification, but rather a
discriminatory and protectionist one. Where young males subject to greater
risk of injury are allowed to decide whether to encounter that risk themselves,
young females, being of equal intelligence, are just as qualified to decide for
themselves.
E. The Contact Sports Exception Should Be Eliminated
If scientific evidence shows that increased risk of injury is a legitimate
concern for some athletes and a school district imposes a safety limitation on
all affected athletes, not just female athletes, such a policy might serve to
legitimately limit the opportunities of some female and male athletes alike.
However, the CSE does not operate as just described and so neither this
justification nor other protectionist justifications and generalizations about
women are legitimate reasons for maintaining the current regulation.
After examining the most promising justifications for maintaining the
CSE, this note advocates immediate elimination. Even if pseudo-legitimate
justifications, such as safety, were not actually the motivating factors behind
CSE implementation, then possible unstated justifications such as male
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73. Furman, supra note 17, at 1180–81 (“In response to the feminist movement, organized sports
were developed as a domain that ‘emphasized physical strength, competition, and violence.’ . . . Men were
threatened by the newfound success of the female community and sought new ways for society to place
greater emphasis on their attributes.” (footnotes omitted)).
74. See Furman, supra note 17, at 1172.
75. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2009) (“[A] recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for
members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved
is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members
of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities
for members of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-
out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport.” (all emphasis added)).
76. See supra note 35.
77. See, e.g., Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
excluding boys from playing on girls’ volleyball teams was not a violation of the equal protection clause
because the policy’s purpose was to promote opportunities for girls and to remedy past discrimination);
Kleczek ex rel. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D.R.I. 1991) (denying
injunctive relief, in part, because plaintiff was unlikely to be successful on the merits of his Equal
Protection claim where excluding male student from girl’s field hockey team was unlikely to be a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause); see generally Daroski, supra note 64, at 153.
78. While the Supreme Court has interpreted the EPC as allowing girls to try out for boys’ teams,
the reverse is not true. This seemingly inequitable distinction on its face may be attributed to the different
rationales at play. Most courts have permitted girls to try out for boys’ teams, but not the reverse, because
increasing athletic opportunities for girls, as well as redressing past discrimination against them, are strong
justifications that are not a concern when boys assert similar rights. See, e.g., Clark, 695 F.2d 1126.
domination theory  or the NCAA’s lobbying interests  certainly do not come73 74
close to legitimizing the exception.
Without the CSE, the rights afforded to female athletes under Title IX are
still slightly different than their rights under the EPC. The pertinent Title IX
regulation, less the CSE, reads that a girl must be allowed to try out for a
boys’ sports team where there is no girls’ team; it does not necessarily permit
a girl to try out for a boys’ soccer team, for example, when the school already
has a girls’ soccer team.  Contrast this, to the Supreme Court’s interpretation75
of the EPC in Virginia, which may stand for the proposition that providing
females with a comparable sports team does not necessarily cure an equal
protection violation.  Even without the CSE, Title IX is arguably more76
restrictive than the EPC. Should Title IX be brought in line with the EPC?
Some scholars question the sex-segregated system itself, and still others
question the fairness of allowing girls to try out for boys’ teams  when courts77
have not permitted the reverse—even when there is no boys’ team on which
a male athlete could play.78
Although CSE elimination would be an improvement, many concerns
about our system of student athletics remain, and academics and courts alike
debate them to this day. However, elimination of the CSE would likely
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79. See supra note 78.
80. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 8, at 340.
81. Notably, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
82. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 339, 351–53 (arguing for sex integration when equal opportunity
cannot be realized and evaluating a proposal in which “skill would become the only qualification for
positions on teams”).
83. See Rebecca A. Kiselewich, In Defense of the 2006 Title IX Regulations for Single-Sex Public
Education: How Separate Can Be Equal, 49 B.C. L. REV. 217, 254–60 (2008). See also Diane Heckman,
Title IX Marks Its 35th Anniversary by Opening the Doors to Single-Sex Public Elementary and Secondary
Schools, 237 ED. LAW REP. 1, 14–16 (2008) (describing the 2006 Title IX Regulations allowing for single-
sex public schools, classes and non-athletic extracurricular activities).
instigate more debate on the status of male athletes and the quest to identify
and promulgate a “better” high school athletic system.79
This note will briefly outline some of the more popular alternatives and
focus particularly on a proposal that has not received much serious discussion,
although it is often mentioned in passing as an alternative to pure sex-
segregation: height/weight requirements as a facially non-discriminatory
system of athletic separation.
PART III. MOVING PAST IX’S CONTACT SPORTS EXCEPTION: THE GOOD,
THE BAD, AND THE POPULAR ALTERNATIVES TO THE SYSTEM
AFTER CSE ELIMINATION
A. Separate Probably Cannot Be Equal, but Is Full Integration Practical?
A close cousin to the CSE debate, Title IX’s provision allowing for sex-
segregated sports has also taken a considerable amount of abuse from
scholars.  The elimination of sex-segregated sports and full integration would80
of course nullify the CSE. This is an attractive proposal in that it comports
both with already-accepted notions in other branches of the law that separate
can never be equal,  and with cultural preferences for obtaining positions by81
way of merit.  Additionally, there may be some danger in keeping the concept82
of separate but equal alive. Several articles arguing for sex-segregated public
education draw support from Title IX’s endorsement of it in the sports
context. They use its existence in one part of the law to reinforce gender
stereotypes in other areas.83
The downside to eliminating sex-segregated teams is that it could
substantially reduce the number of athletic opportunities afforded to women.
No matter how hard feminist theorists try, they cannot eliminate the identifiable
biological differences between men and women simply by saying that they do not
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84. Furman, supra note 17, at 1185–86 (criticizing the “gender-blind” meritocracy approach)
(citations omitted); see also George, supra note 45, at 1144 (“Generally, the physiological distinctions
between men and women will assert themselves by high school and certainly college. While we surely are
long past any assumptions about ‘all’ boys being superior athletes compared to ‘all’ girls, it is nonetheless
likely that any football, basketball, or track team selected based on competitive tryouts would be largely,
if not exclusively, male.” (citation omitted)); Hershtal, supra note 16, at 681 (noting that separate but equal
has been justified by several reasons: physical and psychological differences between the sexes, and
promoting athletic opportunities for women through the use of separate teams because, impliedly, if not for
separate teams, men might dominate women’s sports teams).
85. Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 53, at 1456.
86. See supra notes 8, 15. This solution also fails to address whether it applies equally to girls who
have a girls’ team they could play on. If not, then it might not even provide the same rights as the Equal
Protection Clause, although technically expanding the rights of female athletes under Title IX.
exist. Since the biological differences of strength and speed are the foundation upon
which many sports are built, gender equality through assimilation cannot be achieved
unless contact sports radically alter their structure.84
Whether the differences we perceive between men and women are largely
nurture or largely nature, where separate cannot be equal, the most just system
in theory is a fully integrated system. As long as we attach significance to
differences in gender as it relates to opportunity, we will forever be
dissatisfied because we will never attain equality. Ideally, society will advance
over time to a point where it ceases to make such a huge distinction between
the sexes and comes to view sex, like race, as immutable. Practically, this will
not occur, if at all, anytime soon and so a more practical solution is one that
moves society past the CSE temporarily and aims for more idealistic goals in
the future.
B. Replacing the CSE and an Evaluation of Alternatives
One alternative to the current system is to keep sex-segregated teams
intact, but allow only “exceptional” females to play on boys’ teams.  This85
proposal could be understood as similar to the result under EPC jurisprudence.
Female athletes may use the EPC to enforce their right to try out for a team in
some situations, not for a spot on the team itself. Thus, it is possible that only
a limited number of females will ultimately earn a spot on the boys’ team.
Although this proposal can be interpreted to jibe with the EPC, it might also
limit the rights of female athletes under the EPC. What does it mean to be
“exceptional” as a female athlete? This label is troublesome, as it suggests that
most women should not be permitted to or are not able play with men,
reinforcing stereotypes about women in athletics.86
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excluding boys from playing on girls’ volleyball teams was not a violation of the equal protection clause
because the policy’s purpose was to promote opportunities for girls and to remedy past discrimination);
Kleczek ex rel. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D.R.I. 1991) (denying
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88. See supra note 78.
89. See, e.g., Clark, 695 F.2d 1126; Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 956; see also Williams v. School Dist.,
799 F. Supp. 513, 517 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev’d, 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Obviously, therefore, the
defendant uses a ‘double standard,’ based on gender, in applying Title IX to its sports teams. It is doubtful
whether such blatantly unequal application of the same regulation to boys and girls is lawful.”); id. at 519
(“Thus, we conclude that with respect to Liberty High School, providing a remedy for past discrimination
against girls in athletics does not presently constitute a government interest important enough to justify the
current and continuing policy of prohibiting male students from trying out and playing for designated girls’
teams when no comparable boys’ team is offered.”).
90. Robinson, supra note 8, at 353–56.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 84.
Another problem with this proposal, which has already arisen when
school districts have unilaterally allowed women onto men’s teams, is what
to do with men who seek to play on women’s teams.  As previously stated,87
the courts have different rationales in Equal Protection jurisprudence for
allowing women, but not men, to play on the opposite sex’s sports team and
their position is certainly defensible.  However, the idea of allowing women88
but not men to cross-compete seems to offend commonly-held societal notions
of fairness, and male students have taken this position in taking their game to
the courts.89
Another proposal was coined by its author as, “Women Play
Men—Sometimes, Women Play Women, Men Play Women—Sometimes.”90
Under this proposal, the opportunity for a man or a woman to try out for the
opposite sex’s team would depend on whether that team had advantages or
notoriety not enjoyed by their own sex’s team.  For example, if an91
organization’s women’s volleyball team had a thriving program, national
attention, and many scholarship opportunities, whereas the analogous start-up
men’s team had less funding and little-to-no national attention, a man would
have the right to try out for the women’s team.  In this way, two of the un-92
equalizers of sex-segregated teams in a Title IX regime—traditionally, greater
scholarship opportunities and notoriety for men’s teams—are dealt with while
limiting the possibility of men ousting women from their own teams.93
2010] GIRLS DON’T JUST WANNA HAVE FUN 139
94. As an example, the author of this note personally participated in an over-22 co-ed soccer league
at the Sewickley Sportrak in Sewickley, Pennsylvania. During indoor soccer matches, the league required
that a female teammate “touch” the ball within the red line on the opponent’s side in order for a goal by that
team to count. This author wanted to present all possible options to her readers, but strongly disfavors such
an approach, as first-hand experience has taught her that this kind of adjustment to a game creates
unanticipated incentives that distort the sport. For example, if only one girl is on offense with two males,
the defenders on the opposing team can stop marking the male offenders in possession of the ball to
surround the lone female in order to prevent her from “touching” the ball and validating the goal. This result
is frustrating to an athlete perfectly capable of participating in the goal in her own right.
95. Robinson, supra note 8, at 346.
96. See supra note 94.
97. Furman, supra note 17, at 1188–89.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1188–94.
100. George, supra note 45, at 1111–12.
101. Id. at 1150; Furman, supra note 17, at 1188–94.
102. Furman, supra note 17, at 1189.
Other possible proposals include complete sex integration, where the
rules are adjusted to require female participation.  This type of proposal94
addresses the fact that most sports, especially contact sports, were designed
to meet men’s strengths by attempting to equalize “the playing field” and by
requiring full participation by women.  On the other hand, adjusting the rules95
of a game can create perverse incentives and distort the way the game is
played.96
Another scholar suggests that the very nature of high school sports is to
supplement the education of children and, with that focus in mind, a 50/50
approach should seem less offensive to our social norms regarding athletic
competition.  This approach would place boys and girls on one team, but97
would still maintain sex segregation with regard to actual competition.  In98
this way, the separate-but-unequal funding problems are no longer a concern,
and the questions about the relative strengths and inherent physical ability of
each sex as compared to one another are avoided.99
Another similar approach also calls for a 50/50 split of boys and girls.
However, this proposal would require a team to have half of the total players
on the field be women, and half be men with each sex receiving equal playing
time.  Problems with both approaches are that, inevitably, with only one100
team per school, significantly fewer students will have the opportunity to
participate in extra-curricular sports.  Similarly, the “Components101
Approach” would consist of two groups of players on one team, competing in
every event with the outcome of the match dependent on the joint
performance.102
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110. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 350–51.
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Other possibilities include developing new gender-neutral sports.  This103
approach would eliminate the aforementioned bias in the rules of male-created
contact sports.  Another is to have three teams: two for each sex and one104
based on merit.  While this avoids reduction in women’s opportunities by105
not advocating full sex-integration, it calls into question a school’s ability to
fund three teams, considering that many school districts have trouble just
funding two for each sport.  Similarly, there is a concern that this would106
decrease the level of competition for those left on the segregated teams
because the most talented pool of players would be on the sex-integrated team.
This would leave very little talent, in the opinion of some commentators, on
the women’s team because it has a less talented pool to draw from to begin
with.107
The implementation of a simple quota system,  maintaining the status108
quo temporarily as society moves towards a better understanding of
integration,  and eliminating the rights of a school district to allow opposite109
sex players to try out for different teams  are also solutions that have been110
suggested by commentators as alternatives to the current system.
C. The Possibility of a Height/Weight Standard to Be Applied Equally to
Boys and Girls Seeking to Try out for an Opposite Sex Contact Sports
Team
One alternative system of athletic segregation that is often mentioned, but
rarely discussed in great detail, is a system that considers only objective, non-
sex factors such as speed, size, or strength in separating athletes into different
sports teams.111
As a first step toward a system based on objective, non-sex factors, this
note suggests the possibility of maintaining separate teams for boys and girls
initially, but allowing girls that are above average weight and height in their
age group to try out for a boys’ contact sports team where there is a girls’ team
for the same sport. Similarly, boys below the average height and weight for
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once the contact sports exemption is eliminated. Title IX also requires that an athlete seeking to try out for
the opposite sex’s team be a member of a sex that previously had limited opportunities to participate in the
sport. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2009). On this basis, courts normally deny male athletes the right to try
out for female sports teams under Title IX. See supra note 78.
113. See supra notes 63, 64. Although this note concluded that school districts often discriminatorily
use safety justifications as a basis for sex-segregation, it also stated that safety would be a factor to consider
when moving forward, as opposed to the sole basis for exclusion. See supra pp. 15–16.
114. The Prince George’s County Boys and Girls Club provides rules by which males and females
are placed on teams based on age and weight for youths between the ages of 7 and 16 for tackle football.
About PGCBGC Football, http://www.leagueathletics.com/Page.asp?n=9333&snid=408591238&org=
pgcbgcfootball (last visited May 22, 2010). See also email from Calvin Massie, Executive Dir., Prince
George’s County Boys & Girls Club, Lanham, MD to author (Jan. 5, 2009) (on file with author) (“[W]e
allow girls to play on the same athletic teams as the boys or they can play on separate all-girls teams. If a
female participates with the boy teams, then they are evaluated under the same criteria as the boys. But boys
cannot play on the girl teams. For football we use a weight and age chart to form teams and the girl
standards are the same as the boys.” (emphasis added)); but see Croudace & Desmarais, supra note 53,
at 1457 (criticizing this approach).
115. Even though Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence lends little credence to the safety
justification, private institutions are still otherwise free to create policies excluding females based on safety
because they are otherwise protected by Title IX’s contact sports exception. See supra pp. 5–9, 19–21.
116. See infra p. 27. Pertinently, proposals for full sex-integration and for separating teams based
solely on non-sex criteria.
117. Furman, supra note 17, at 1185.
their age group would be permitted to try out for the girls’ team. Where a
school did not fund a sports team for each sex, athletes would have an
unlimited right to try out for the opposite sex’s team. For example, where
there is no girls’ football team, a girl would have the right to try out for the
boys’ team without any limitation.112
A first step past the CSE and its offensive, broad-based exclusion of
women based only on sex is one that begins to allow women, if they met an
objectively set height/weight requirement,  to try out for a boys’ contact113
sports team and become part of the team if they possess the necessary skills
and ability.  The advantage to this proposal, as compared to Title IX’s114
regulations, is that it deemphasizes perceived differences between the sexes
by moving towards integration and by applying the same rules to both male
and female athletes. Importantly, this proposal also somewhat neutralizes the
safety argument so often raised by school districts in the past.  In addition,115
it avoids the problem encountered by so many of the aforementioned
proposals  of boys invading what were once exclusively “girls’ teams” and116
undoing the opportunities Title IX has made available to girls.  The proposal117
avoids this problem by limiting the eligibility of boys for cross-team
participation. Again, this kind of system would more smoothly transition our
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current system to one that deemphasizes sex as an eligibility factor and
focuses more on the abilities of the individual.
Like any proposal, this one has its disadvantages. One might counter that
imposing objective criteria, like height and weight requirements, serves to
merely translate de jure sex discrimination into de facto sex discrimination,
because girls of above average size are still less likely to make a boys’ contact
sports team than boys of below averages sizes are to make a girls’ team. First,
this proposal is only meant to be a step in the right direction and in that sense,
a limited amount of de facto segregation is preferable to Title IX’s current de
jure bar. Further, society is comfortable with de facto results that limit women
in other areas. For example, under Title VII, certain types of occupations may
establish standards that effectively preclude many women from qualifying.118
Although the objective factors may still limit some women from trying out for
boys’ teams, this proposal is a step in the right direction since more women
than allowed under Title IX will qualify to try out.
Another issue, which is neither unique to this proposal nor the other
options noted supra, is why this proposal should be adopted at all since it
arguably gives girls, at the very least, fewer opportunities then what they are
likely entitled to receive under the EPC. However, as noted above, Equal
Protection jurisprudence is less clear on the issue of whether girls can try out
for boys’ teams when a comparable girls’ team is offered.  If this proposal119
were implemented, it would enhance the rights of female athletes attending
private institutions, because this proposal is much broader than what Title IX
alone permits.  This proposal would also ease the burden on female athletes120
at public institutions, as smaller numbers would have to enforce their Equal
Protection rights.121
Another concern associated with, for example, allowing boys without
their own volleyball team unlimited try-outs for the girls’ teams, would be the
probable result of boys largely displacing girls on these teams. Arguably, this
result is unlikely, as a significant amount of boys’ interest and support in
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volleyball may obligate a school district to create a separate boys’ volleyball
team.122
Although there are disadvantages to this proposal, and implementation of
a height/weight requirement has been dubbed “difficult to devise,”  it makes123
sense as a small step toward a system of athletics that does not continue to
reinforce sex differences and harm women’s opportunities to advance in
athletics. Women who meet certain objective standards, and who possess the
requisite level of athletic ability to make a boys’ team, can enjoy the benefits
that come from playing on certain male sports teams, such as greater
opportunity for scholarships and recruitment. Importantly, allowing boys
similar rights is not just for their benefit; placing less emphasis on sex
differences by way of objective, non-sex factors helps move society past
preconceived notions about the athletic ability of girls. Although this proposal
initially keeps sex-segregated teams in place, our athletic system can begin to
move past sex and focus more on each individual’s ability, thereby expanding
opportunities for women in sports, which is consistent with the underlying
purpose of the statute.124
PART IV. WHY IS THE CSE STILL AROUND?
Nine years ago, one author speculated that perhaps the climate of female
sports sensations—the WNBA, Women’s Ice Hockey Olympic recognition,
and US Women’s Soccer World Cup, to name a few—would create enough
political momentum that the CSE would be eliminated.  Not only has this125
political pressure not occurred, but a trend toward related single-sex education
shows that rather than breaking down gender stereotypes, we are embracing
them.  Similarly, it does not seem likely that the Supreme Court will126
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invalidate the CSE as unconstitutional anytime soon, as it has consistently
denied certiorari.127
Part of the problem is the lack of opposition to the CSE from females.128
In line with that reasoning, there is a disconnect between what scholars
consider an archaic or old-fashioned notion and what society—namely, those
who vote—considers archaic or old-fashioned.  Many of the stated129
justifications for upholding the CSE are laughable to academics.  No matter130
how often law review articles cite the debate over the CSE, comment that
elimination is “obviously needed,”  and assert no further debate is necessary,131
this is simply not true. Protectionism is still generally accepted by the public.
A specific example of this is that, as of the 2008 cross country season, eleven
states still prohibited girls from competing over the same distances as their
male peers.132
Many of the initial justifications for the CSE contribute to its continued
existence. For example, initial generalizations that all women could not
compete physically with men created barriers for women wishing to
participate in male-only sports. But as another author on the subject
eloquently put it,
This is really the wrong question. The right question is whether there are any women
who can compete on the level that men are on. Are all of the best, fastest and
strongest men faster, better and stronger than the best, fastest, strongest women? Is
there a woman better, faster and stronger than the weakest male player on a given
team?133
Some members of society have moved a step beyond this archaic way of
thinking; accepting that there are some women who may be capable enough
to compete with men. Despite this, there still subsists a subtler perception that
only exceptional females can compete on the same level as men in any sport,
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139. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Book Review, GIRL, Fight, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. &
JUST. 254, 255–56 (2007) (noting that for today’s twenty and thirty-something year old women, “feminism
has become a bad word-the new ‘F’ word.”). However, there is also hope and a lot of excitement among
especially contact sports.  This perception perpetuates a false sense of134
satisfaction with the standing law. Scholars have long argued that the CSE
should be eliminated because regardless of men’s supposed athletic and
physical superiority, the duty to treat women, including exceptional female
athletes, as individuals makes an overall bar inappropriate.  The perception135
that competitive female skill is not necessarily common and the notion that
only a small number of women are able to compete with men is held by
many.  By focusing arguments on only the rights of the exceptional to play136
with the “big boys,” academia reinforces these social beliefs.  Hopefully,137
both the research in this note and young women like Angela Kost have
apprised the reader that co-ed competition is not just reserved for the rare
female athlete who can compete with men, but that it is becoming more
common as schools unilaterally permit girls to participate in men’s sports and
as girls utilize, when possible, their rights under the EPC.  It is elitist at best,138
and foolish at worst, to assume that protectionism is antiquated, archaic, and
no longer at issue in the context of female athletics.139
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middle school and high school-aged girls already playing on boys’ contact sport teams. Hopefully their
beliefs, enthusiasm, and experiences will culminate in political action later in life. For example, this young
woman writes, “I think that girls should be equal to guys. I’m in 8th grade and am looking 4 a highschool.
[sic] So far I’ve found out that some of the high schools that [are] in my area will let me play foot ball. [sic]
And I am soooooo excited to try out next year.” Posting of Rachel to SerendipUpdate’s Blog,
http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1753?page=2 (Feb. 6, 2008, 11:07) (last visited May 22,
2010). See also postings of various individuals to InfoSports: Girls in Football, http://www.infosports.com/
football/5.htm (last visited May 22, 2010).
MOVING PAST THE CSE: CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this note was to advocate elimination of the CSE
and to discuss the state of the law after elimination, as well as proposed
alternative athletic systems. The CSE, while severely criticized in this note
and by others, still currently discriminates against women based only on sex.
In researching this note, the author came across many stories about girls and
young women attempting to or successfully participating in contacts sports
with men. Hopefully, this information helps dispel any qualms a reader might
have about the timeliness of this issue as none of these female athletes actually
has the right to play contact sports with males under the Title IX regulations.
Rather, their right to play depends on the discretion of individual Title IX
private entities or, if they fortuitously attend a public institution, their ability
to enforce their rights under the EPC. Despite many scholarly articles on the
subject predicting change, the status quo remains and the reasons for this need
to be more deeply examined. In moving past the CSE, the public, and
specifically student-athletes, need to be made fully aware of the importance
of this section of the law. Hopefully, the inspirational stories of these young
female athletes will translate into political action as they grow older.
